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BOOK REVIEW
CONTRACT LAW iN AmERICA. By Lawrence M. Friedman.' Madison: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 1965. Pp. x, 280. $6.50.
The work in American legal history seems to have advanced rapidly over
the past few years. In addition to the Journal-whose continued existence
is itself a hopeful sign-there are an ever increasing number of monographs,
editions of lawyers' works, and the like. Most heartening of all, there are
even casebooks on the subject.2 Nevertheless, it remains a terribly diffuse
and unsatisfying field. Nothing seems to relate much to anything else. One
result, it seems to me, is that the average lawyer has very little idea of legal
history even of the most elementary sort.
I should like to suggest that the reason for this state of affairs is that no
one has ever constructed a framework or theory for American legal history
that is easily grasped. These exist in abundance for other types of history.
Turner's Frontier Theory, Namier's theory of English politics in the reign
of George III, or Pirenne's theory about the effect of the Moorish and
Norse invasions on European economic development are examples. They
exist even in schoolboy history: 3 the Puritans came to America to find reli-
gious freedom; the Revolutionary War resulted from George III and his
ministers refusing to recognize the colonists' rights as free-born Englishmen,
etc. It does not matter if such theories are "wrong," even very wrong.
Once there is a framework which bears any relation to the facts, it is pos-
sible to find some meaning in the whole-often by demolishing the frame-
work or theory. It may be argued that the quantity of the data makes it
impossible to construct even the most elementary theory for American legal
history at this time. But these are surely no more numerous nor complicated
than economic data, and yet economic histories abound, as do social his-
tories, cultural and religious histories, and all the rest. It seems to me that it
would be a great advantage to have wide currency given to any theory no
matter how outrageous. For example, some such farrago as: the planting
and mercantile classes of the seaboard sought to adopt English rules to this
country in order to prepetuate their position, but the increasing strength of
the small holders and propertyless men on the frontier caused these to be re-
1. Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
2. See, e.g., J. SMITH, CASES & MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT ov LEGAL INSTI-
TUTIONS (1965); S. KIMBALL, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM
(1966).
3. That is to say, American public schoolboy history, not the sort of thing known to
those extraordinary schoolboys of Macauly's acquaintance.
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jected until a new oligarchy arose which demanded a new class-buttressing
legal system, as is shown by the history of the spendthrift trust, etc. Such a
theory would enable one to organize the data preliminarily, after which it
could be shot down. Of course it would be pleasant to have an elegant and
accurate theory, but legal history could use a Parson Weems. Instead we
have the Life and Letters of Mr. Justice- , the Records of the Or-
phan's Court of , etc. All very fine but hard to put together.
There is, however, one body of work which is almost an exception to this,
or at any rate one body of work that I am aware of-that being done at the
University of Wisconsin under the direction of Professor Hurst. The fact
that it does approach a theory would, to my mind, make this work the most
interesting and significant that is being done in the United States even if it
did not have other virtues-though it certainly has. The reason I qualify
the work as almost an exception is that there has not yet come from this
school an explicit theory or outline of American legal history, nor have they
produced, as yet, a legal history of the United States, or even of Wisconsin.4
Nevertheless they do have a theory, or rather two, and these pervade all
their work, or so it seems to me. The first is methodological: American
legal history, at least in its private law aspects, is the history of individual
states and must, in consequence, be studied state by state, in depth. The
second theory is that the law is a social phenomenon, and must be studied
in its social context with particular emphasis on economics.'
Professor Friedman's book is the most recent application of this approach,
and illustrates both its virtues and its defects. His decision to investigate the
history of contracts apparently resulted from his having taught the subject.
The traditional approach would have been to take certain doctrines and
4. Professor James Hurst came fairly close to writing a history in THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN LAW (1950), but since he purported to be writing only an institutional his-
tory, and avoided treating substantive law developments except incidentially, it does not
give the appearance of a general history, though doubtless it contains enough material,
even on substantive law matters, to make it possible to consider it as one. Hurst's LAW
AND ECONOMic GROWTH (1964), comes closer to being a legal history of Wisconsin, and
hence, by extrapolation, of the United States, but the fact that it concentrates on the
lumber industry makes this a little hard for the non-initiate to grasp. As a consequence,
it seems to me, its impact on the legal community has been small. On the other hand,
its very high quality as history is admittedly due in large measure to its concentration.
5. This is based primarily on the work that I have seen that has actually appeared
under the aegis of Professor Hurst, works such as that under review, and S. KIMBALL,
INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (1960), and G. KUEHNL, THE WISCONSIN BUSINESS
CORPORATION (1959). Professor Hurst's theories about law and society in the United
States are, of course, considerably more complex than the summary I have given. See J.
HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 1-27 (1960). What I
am interested in, really, is popularized history and easy theories, and it seems to me that
one can legitimately over-simplify the Wisconsin school as indicated.
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trace their development from England, through various state courts and
commentators down to the Restatement, and even, if he had been feeling
daring, the Uniform Commercial Code. Instead he limited himself to one
state, Wisconsin, and read all the cases decided by the Supreme Court of
that state for three significant periods: I, 1836-1861; II, 1905-1907, 1913;
III, 1955-1958. He analyzed the cases and set them in their social and
economic context (he does not pay much attention to politics), including
relevant legislative activity, during the period. The cases are analyzed in
two ways: by subject matter and by doctrine. The most important cate-
gories of subject matter in all three periods are land, labor and sales cases,
though of course the nature of the transactions litigated varies. So, for ex-
ample, in the case of land, cases between land dealers and speculative inves-
tors predominate in Period I, support cases in Period II, and cases arising
out of the real estate subdivisions that were created after World War II in
Period III. In general, the cases are relatively unimportant-that is, they
are not limited to, or even principally composed of, important disputes
between important people or type cases that are important to a lot of people
(a test case of the validity of time charges in installment sales for example).
There is often, even in the modem period, relatively little money involved.
Moreover, though the cases contain indications of their social background,
they do not reflect these conditions very accurately. For example, the labor
and service cases have almost nothing to do with either agricultural or in-
dustrial labor.6 The "sales" category excludes sales for resale which are
categorized under mercantile contract. These are considerably fewer than
sales and almost disappear in the modem period.7
From the point of view of doctrine, the three most important categories
are: fraud, illegality, and performance and breach, though in the third
period, there were more cases involving construction (interpretation) than
fraud or illegality. However, all of the categories have some cases and there
does not seem to be much change from period to period. The doctrine in
general does not change greatly according to Professor Friedman.8
The legislative activity is somewhat chaotic. As Professor Friedman in-
dicates, all economic regulation affects contracts in a way, and hence he
limits himself to certain trends.' In Period I there is a great deal of leg-
islation dealing with debtors and creditors (notably exemptions), and
initial governmental regulation (the validity of gambling debts and the
6. Pp. 44-52.
7. Pp. 58-60.
8. Pp. 138-39.
9. P. 141.
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like). This increased greatly in Period II with the La Follettes' progressiv-
ism (statutes on hours of labor, insurance, licensing of occupations, anti-
trust, etc.). These are continued and were tinkered with in Period III
(although by this time, the torch had, of course, passed to Washington).
In analyzing these results, Professor Friedman emphasizes the importance
of the relationship between contract law and the market. In the early period
"legal institutions were so framed as to give support to the market."'"
He points out that this freedom was often used by the powerful to
restrict competition-or the market-with the result that statutes were
enacted to curb such action.1' He also senses a declining willingness by the
courts to apply abstract doctrines. Rather, there is a tendency to arrive at
fair results by whatever route is available." At the same time as the decline
in abstractness, 3 there is a decline in activity (in contract matters). This
partially resulted from a decrease in the courts' effectiveness as an institution
-particularly in the business area, due to its lack of expertise, for example,
and the general dislike of law suits. One interesting result of the loss of busi-
ness is the failure of similar fact situations to recur, which means that the
court cannot be as creative as it should.' 4 Businessmen solved their own
problems among themselves. At the same time the legislature and admin-
istrative agencies "usurped" many of the courts' functions. Mr. Friedman
traces finally the styles of the courts from creativity to abstraction to "legal
realism." In the long run he decides that courts in contract cases (and else-
where as well) have outlived their function.' 5
10. P. 184.
11. Pp. 186-90.
12. Pp. 190-92.
13. By abstractness, Professor Friedman means essentially the traditional doctrines
expressed in the usual way. A court that applies "the law" without reference to the
particular facts except insofar as these are necessary to determine which person's name
will be substituted for the symbols in the formula (offeror and offeree for example) is
acting abstractly. A court which, like the New Jersey court in I-ennigson v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), interests itself in the economic roles of
the parties, changing marketing patterns and the like is departing from "abstractness,"
and may, if it takes account for example of the susceptibility of the particular plaintiff
to be over-reached, recognize the "unique particularity" of the case. "Consumer," "manu-
facturer," and the like are abstractions of economics and marketing which Mr. Friedman
also dislikes. P. 190. But then "elderly invalid," "manual laborer," "small town druggist"
and the like are also abstractions-perhaps of art. They have, at any rate, a certain
"resonance," as indeed do most (all?) nouns.
14. Pp. 201-02. It is interesting to consider this phenomenon in the light of Holmes'
ideas on the way common law grows. See M. Howz, TH PRovING YEARS 82-83
(1963), in which "The Theory of Torts," 7 AM. L. Rzv. 652, 654 (1873), is referred to.
15. Pp. 210-15.
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Mr. Friedman's conclusions from all this, if I understand them, are that
contract law began with abstraction (promissor, promissee, consideration,
not buyer and seller of farm land, or widow or farmer and rich buyer of
farm land). Freedom of contract was substantially the rule, and thus con-
tract theory and economic theory were essentially identical. In the course of
the period studied, the "law," which is essentially that agreements will be
enforced as made, did not change greatly except where the legislature de-
cided to remove the subject matter from freedom of contract (the permis-
sible hours of labor for example).
This shows, it seems to me, the strength and weakness of the book and
the approach. The strength is what Mr. Friedman says it is: the combina-
tion of insights which only a depth study can give-and in the United
States a depth study of more than one state is almost impossible-together
with the help which anyone in the Wisconsin group can get from his fel-
lows.16 Mr. Friedman sees contracts as conduct of actual people engaged
in certain specified activities in a particular economic, social and political
context which he is aware of and tells about. Moreover, he does not need
to consider only the "contractual" activities of the parties since he has other
data about them. The result is then, in fact, a setting out of "law in action."
Something we rarely get. In some ways it seems to me that this is the book's
most valuable feature. One is forced to see contracts in terms of land specu-
lation, industrial development and populist legislation. Moreover, the ex-
tremely varied activities of the state legislature are set out. There may be
virtues in abstracting the "Law of Contracts" from its context, as lawyers
generally do, but now at least we have a good idea of what the context is.
But there are also disadvantages to the approach, and one is its parochial-
ism. If Mr. Friedman really considered the English law, for example, to say
nothing of the continental, it seems to me that he would not be quite so
confident in equating the market economy with contract law, nor would it
be so clear that its importance had disappeared with its decline in the utter-
ances of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. After all, English property law is
essentially a congealed form of contract, from the original feudal tenures to
the modem deed (whose immediate ancestor was, in terms, a contract of
sale). This is to say nothing of the law of trusts or the Strict Family Settle-
ment.
Moreover, while it is of course true that the standard sources for seven-
teenth and eighteenth century law, such as Blackstone and Viner, contain
little on contract, as Professor Friedman points out,17 this may mean only
16. P. vfi.
17. P. 17.
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that the common law courts were leaving this subject matter to other courts
or tribunals. Or, for that matter, that Common Law commentators did
not care to talk about it, for the seventeenth and eighteenth century reports
are so poor that we cannot say with confidence what the courts were doing.
But in any event, if we move across the Channel, there is something very
like our law of contracts which existed before a market economy had de-
veloped. Thus, Grotius, writing in 1619-21 on the law of the Netherlands,
placed freedom of contract at the beginning of his discussion of the law of
obligations. He then proceeded to treat such familiar topics as capacity,
illegality, cause, conditions, unjust enrichment, and offer and acceptance,
as well as a number of special contracts."8 In Pothier, a century or so later
(a book that was widely circulated in the United States and England) there
is a similar organization.19 Then at the time Langdell and similar thinkers
were doing the organizing of contract law which Mr. Friedman dislikes so,
the modern continental codes were being drafted or enforced, and these
seem to me to contain rules remarkably like those of the Restatement,"0 and
the most recent addition to the group, the 1964 Civil Code of Russia."
It may be, of course, that a study like Professor Friedman's of the actions
of Dutch courts over the past 350 years would yield results very similar to
his study of 120 years of Wisconsin legal history. I should not be at all sur-
prised if it would. But the fact that Europeans generally seem to express
roughly the same ideas about contract as ours, and regard it as useful to
express them-if this is indeed the case, and it may simply be that I misread
the foreign law-is itself a cultural fact or datum of considerable signif-
icance. One cannot ignore Christianity simply because one finds the Bible
hard (or impossible) to believe. And I do not mean to be sacrilegious for
I think that the mental attitudes of the higher criticism and those of legal
realism are similar. It is just that one is a century behind the other. And
Professor Friedman's work-like that of his colleagues-seems to me to be
in the direct line of that of the legal realists.2 So far this has been much
18. H. GRoTius, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF HOLLAND 295-307 (Lee transl. 1926).
19. See M. POTHIR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 2-63 (2d Am. ed.
Evans 1839).
20. In the FRENCH CODE CIVIL, the preliminary provisions on contracts are § 1101,
definition of contract as an argreement to give, do or omit doing something; § 1102,
definition of bi-lateral contract; § 1103, definition of unilateral contract. § 1108 gives
four essentials to a contract: consent; capacity; a certain object; legal cause. The pro-
vision on the preeminence of the contract over other provisions of the law once it is
entered into is § 1134.
21. See, e.g., CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC:
AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION §§ 158, 160-65, 167 (W. Gray ed. 1966). Of course there
are differences. Id. at §§ 159, 166.
22. Curiously, Professor Friedman does not mention Professor LIewellyn's work on the
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stronger on the destructive side than in replacing the old myths with new
ones (or hypotheses or theories if one prefers). Mr. Friedman offers the
market-in effect, an economic interpretation of contract. There are other
objections to this besides the historical,13 but on the other hand it does offer
a framework on which to organize the data and thus gives the work a co-
herence it otherwise would not have. Doubtless that is sufficient justifica-
tion for it.
All of this is just to say, I suppose, that I do not believe that Professor
Friedman has written the history of the American law of contracts. But he
has written a history, and that is something we did not have before. Anyone
who reads his book attentively may well find points with which he disagrees,
may indeed disagree with the whole theory, but by disagreeing he will, in
effect, construct his own theory, his own history, and that is just what a
good history should produce.24 Good histories also sometimes produce ex-
panded second editions by the same author, and such a work would in this
case be most welcome. 5
WILLrAm C. JoNEs*
change that has taken place in the work of the appellate courts in the Unitcd States
although their analysis seems to me to be similar in many ways. To be sure, Professor
Llewellyn seemed to feel that the courts had progressed to a valuable new style or
method. See K. LLEWELLYN, TE CommoN LAw TRADITION 41-45 (1960), while Pro-
fessor Friedman apparently regards the current approach as one of many aspects of the
decadence of state courts. Pp. 213-315.
23. One of which is pointed out by the author. One of his principal categories in
Period II is support cases, i.e., cases involving agreements, usually by children, to support
their parents in their old age. In exchange the parents give property, such as a farm, to
the children. Later there is a dispute over whether adequate support has been given.
There does not seem to be much point in connecting such agreements with the "market,"
particularly if, as Professor Friedman suspects, they are, for the most part, an attempt
to reproduce by means of contract the European village customs of those who entered
into them. Pp. 36-37.
24. A view shared by Holmes it would seem. See H. Howa, TE PROVINO Yra~s
137 (1963).
25. It would be nice, for example, to have all the cases decided by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court since its founding, but that is unquestionably too much to ask. More
within the range of possibility, perhaps, would be to have fuller reports of the cases and
statutes that were studied. Thus a list of all 585 of them with a brief statement of the
category and principal doctrines applicable to each would be desirable. Most important of
all, of course, would be to have Professor Friedman's additional conclusions or opinions
as he continues to work with the material.
* Professor of Law, Washington University.
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